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Abstract  The budget of a project reflects the cost of the 
investment needed to build an infrastructure, install a system 
or acquire new materials or supplies. A well-formulated 
budget in accordance with market prices, allows contractors 
to prepare offers according to their technical, economic and 
financial characteristics. On the other hand, it avoids current 
philosophies that aim to get the contract at any price. 
Philosophies subsequently used to point out problems and 
claims during the execution of the project (contradictory 
prices, delays, etc.) in order to recover some or the entire 
economic bid carried out during the tendering. In this paper a 
simple and fast methodology is developed to check if the 
tendering price is in accordance with market prices, so that 
the economic viability of the project is not at risk. The 
application of the methodology on a sample of projects 
allows us to check the influence of the type of project (civil 
or building) on the characteristics of the budget. It also 
allows us to point out the insufficient economic endowment 
of the projects as the start of the subsequent problems during 
the execution of the work. 
Keywords  Budget, Tendering, Public Procurement, 
Building, Civil Works, Market Prices 
 
1. Introduction 
Public procurement in first world countries makes up 
between 10 to 15% of their gross domestic product (GDP) 
[1-2], and sometimes these values are even greater, so 
competitive bidding is one of the fundamental pillars of the 
construction sector [3-6].  
Public procurement of construction works has a number of 
characteristics that distinguish it from the private sector [3,7] 
and at the same time give it a greater complexity [8-10]. 
The award of a contract by an administration depends on a 
number of endpoints. In the European Union, Directive 
2004/18/EC [11] regulates public procurement and describes 
the tendering criteria (such as price, quality technical merit, 
aesthetics and functional characteristics, environmental 
characteristics, running costs, profitability, customer service, 
technical assistance, delivery date, execution time, etc.) that 
allow the contracting authority to select the economically 
most advantageous tender (EMAT). 
The EMAT, based on several criteria, is traditionally 
called the procedure contest, while the bid which is based 
solely on a single criterion, which must inevitably be the 
price, is the procedure traditionally known as auction. These 
rules are common practice in most of the public procurement 
sector and are also used in many procedures in the private 
sector [12-13].  
The evaluation criteria used can be divided into two 
groups: the criteria evaluated by formulae and those 
evaluated by value judgments. For the former, various 
predetermined formulae can be employed, including aspects 
such as price, delivery time, the necessary labor for the 
project, etc. However, the scores for the criteria assessed by 
value judgments will always contain some subjective bias by 
the individual who performs the evaluation. 
Research on tendering criteria has traditionally focused on 
developing optimal bidding price prediction models or 
bidding strategies [14-17]. The decision about whether to 
participate in a tender is complex, and the decision factors 
and their relative importance vary between businesses 
[9,18-23]. Models have been developed that assist decision 
making based on: neural networks [24-27], AHP-ANP 
techniques [28-29], game theory [30], DEA techniques 
[31-32], graphical models [33-34] or a combination of 
several techniques [35]. 
Regarding the scoring formulae used (Economic Scoring 
Formulae, ESF), there are studies that analyze their behavior 
and establish guidelines or recommendations for use [36-40]. 
Once the bids have been submitted, the contracting 
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authority considers the bidders’ proposals. The bidders may 
occasionally deviate from rational behavior and make 
anomalous offers (also known as outliers), at prices much 
lower or higher than the other bidders. 
Impossibly high offers, which do not expect to win the 
auction, are known as courtesy bids [41-42] and may be 
made for any number of reasons; the buyer may have little 
interest in the contract, or lack the resources and skills to 
properly submit a suitable bid, or may simply make an offer 
to ensure being considered in future procedures [43]. 
Impossibly low offers (known as Abnormally Low 
Tenders (ALT)) [44], are those considered as 
disproportionate if too low to provide a normal level of profit, 
and cannot be explained on the basis of construction methods, 
the technical solution chosen, the originality of the work or 
the favorable conditions of the bidder.  
There are many reasons to explain this behavior: the 
bidder may be in desperate need of the contract, even though 
it may turn into a financial loss. He may lack experience in 
auctions or may have miscalculated the costs and the return 
needed to recoup its funding [45-46]. There have also been 
cases in which a low bid was deliberately submitted to oust a 
competitor, protect a company’s position in the market or 
gain access to a new market [47-48], a phenomenon known 
as predatory pricing [49]. 
In an industry as important as construction, with poor 
profitability and insufficient company resources, ALTs have 
consequences for national economies and international 
competitiveness. The final cost of the work is in many cases 
above the price at which the project was awarded [50-54]. 
Some authors have analyzed the mathematical formulae or 
tools to determine which bids are ‘abnormal’ or ‘risky’ [43, 
55-56]. Some methods detect ALTs by assessing the 
deviation of the offer from the average bid [57-58], while 
others use graphical methods [59]. 
The reduction in the number of investments in public 
procurement and the rules which govern it, have lead bidders 
to create business policies that could be summarized as "get 
the contract and run" [60] or "sign the contract and claim" 
[61]. These policies are based on getting the contract at all 
costs (with abnormally low bids or very significant 
improvements for the administration) and transferring the 
economic problems to the execution of the work with 
substantial claims on erroneous measurements, inconsistent 
prices, modified projects, etc. In the first place, these actions 
involve a delay in the execution of the projects and at times 
threaten the viability of the project [62-63]. 
Many of these situations could be avoided if the projects 
were financially sustained, i.e. if the tendering price 
estimated was in accordance with the market price, as 
indicated by the regulations. 
In this paper a methodology from the point of view of the 
administration is developed. The objective of the 
methodology is to check if the tendering price is in 
accordance with the market prices, to avoid that the 
economic viability of the project is at risk. This methodology 
will be applied previously to the tendering of the project. If 
the budget of the project is not according to the market prices 
the project will not tendered and will be re-studied.  
The paper is structured by five sections. First section is the 
introduction on the topic. Section two of this paper, 
“Definitions” describes a series of basic concepts for the 
development of the methodology. In section three, the 
methodology is developed and an application example is 
given. In section four, “Results”, the results of applying the 
methodology on a list of thirty-nine projects are presented, 
and finally, section five shows the conclusions from the 
article. 
2. Definitions 
According to the European directives, the economic value 
of the tender is defined as the contract execution budget 
(CEB) plus value added tax (VAT). CEB reflects the 
investment required to implement a project and is composed 
of the material execution budget (MEB), overheads (OH) 
and profit (P). 
MEB reflects the cost of implementing the various units 
that make up the project, while OH reflects a percentage of 
between 13% and 17% of the MEB that covers the structural, 
financial, tax, and other costs that fall on the contractor. The 
contractor’s profit is seen as a percentage of MEB – and is 
usually 6%. 
The cost or price of each of the project work units consists 
of direct costs (DC) and indirect costs (IC). DC includes the 
labor (LAB) directly involved in the execution of the work 
unit, materials on site (MAT), as well as the staff costs, fuel 
and energy used operating machinery and equipment, and 
depreciation and maintenance of equipment and facilities 
(MACH). These costs are reflected formally in the budget 
document known as the simple pricing table (labor, materials 
and equipment). Additionally, all units of work usually 
include a small percentage called supplementary direct costs 
(SDC) that includes small items of equipment or tools that 
are difficult to quantify. 
Some work units may include other simple work units 
called ancillary prices: such as mortar and concrete. These 
are defined in the simple pricing tables of the budget 
document, and they are termed as AP in the present study. 
IC includes installation costs for on-site offices, 
communications, construction of warehouses, workshops, 
temporary building for staff, laboratories, costs of technical 
and administrative staff assigned exclusively to the work, 
and contingencies. IC is usually computed as a constant 
percentage of DC for all project work units – depending on 
the nature of the work, the total budget, and the expected 
project completion time. 
In short, we can calculate that the material execution 
budget (MEB) is equal to: 
MEB = MACH + LAB + MAT + AP + SDC + IC  (1) 
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3. Materials and Methods 
The proposed methodology is developed to check if the 
tendering price is in accordance with the market prices, in 
order to avoid that the economic viability of the projects is at 
risk. This methodology has some phases (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.  Methodology. Source: Prepared by authors 
The first step of the methodology is to collect the 
information of the Project, in particular of the Budget and the 
Annex of Prices. 
The second phase consists in the selection of basic prices 
of the materials, labor and machinery with the greatest 
economic weight in the project. Prices are selected from 
basic price tables using a total of ten units from each 
category (labor, machinery and materials). 
In the third phase a check between the selected basic 
prices and the basic prices on the reference database is 
carried out. In this case, the construction prices database 
used by the project team (if the information is available) will 
be chosen as a baseline database. Otherwise, the database of 
construction prices of the regional or national body where 
the project is located will be used. 
The sample of selected prices is considered valid when at 
least 20 basic prices (of the 30 selected) from the project are 
compared with 20 basic prices from the reference database. 
The acceptance criterion for basic prices is that there is no 
more than a 15% difference above or below database prices. 
Finally, a project is considered valid from the price point 
of view when at least 70% of basic prices (namely, 14 items) 
have been accepted after comparison with the reference 
prices.  
If a project is deemed valid, then the contracting authority 
will consider that the cost of the project matches market 
prices and so the tendering file will be processed. If a project 
is considered invalid, the project will be returned to the 
project team for an analysis of the proposed solution with 
respect to market prices (including materials used and 
construction processes). 
Projects involving implementation processes, 
organizational processes, technologies, materials, or 
locations that are unusual may be regarded as special 
projects and the contracting authority, having submitted the 
project to the corresponding economic analysis described 
above, must decide on the viability of the project. If the 
project is declared economically invalid but the contracting 
authority decides to make it viable because of its special 
characteristics, then this decision must be appropriately 
justified with an explanatory document placed in the project 
file. 
The methodology described has been applied over a 
sample of thirty nine projects tendered by public 
administrations. The projects included in the sample have 
been tendered between 2008 and 2011 and the required 
collected information has been the economic data, the sheets 
of administrative clauses and the results of the tender. 
In Tables 1, 2 and 3 an example of the procedure for each 
of the projects studied is shown, indicating the selected basic 
prices corresponding to Labor, Machinery and Materials and 
the comparison with those prices from the reference database. 
The data presented are for the project No. 6 tendered by the 
Consell Valencia de l'Esport, corresponding to the "Enabling 
Works in the Building for the Socio Cultural and Sports 
Center in Mislata (Valencia, Spain)". 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
INITIAL INFORMATION (BUDGET) 
  
SELECTION OF BASIC PRICES OF THE BUDGET 
  
COMPARISON WITH BASIC PRICES FROM REFERENCE DATABASE 
  
VALIDATION OF THE COMPARISON 
  
VALIDATION OF THE BUDGET 
  
RESULTS: AGREEMENT / REVIEW 
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Table 1.  Comparison of Materials Basic Prices. Source: Prepared by authors 
Materials Project Price (euros) 
Database  
Price (euros) 
Project Price / 
Database Price 
(%) 
Comparison 
Project Amount 
(Measurement x 
Project Price) 
(euros) 
Vitomodul Viessmann heating 
unit 575 KW 31,565.71 --- --- --- 31,565.71 
Biomass Boiler 300 KW 50,486.97 --- --- --- 50,486.97 
Astral Heat Pump BDP30F 14,954.06 --- --- --- 74,770.30 
Team BC Ciatesa Roof Top 
Model IPF-120-U MC11 10,008.92 --- --- --- 30,026.76 
Ribbed panel of 30 mm thickness 123.43 19.81 623.07% OUT OF RANGE 35,987.50 
Platform consisting of 
galvanized structural steel 123.14 --- --- --- 28,691.62 
Acoustic panel 117.29 --- --- --- 169,263.78 
Black Marquina marble tile 
40x40x2 cm 41.05 --- --- --- 55,180.27 
HA 25 / B / 20 / IIa 64.6 73.58 87.80% IN RANGE 52,571.67 
Fiberglass Panel 16.46 --- --- --- 30,590.91 
Table 2.  Comparison of Labor Basic Prices. Source: Prepared by authors 
Labor Project Price (euros) 
Database  
Price (euros) 
Project Price / 
Database Price 
(%) 
Comparison 
Project Amount 
(Measurement x 
Project Price) (euros) 
First Officer in construction 16.97 20.3 83.60% OUT OF RANGE 248,261.24 
Specialized Workman in 
construction 15.92 19.05 83.57% OUT OF RANGE 95,029.11 
Pawn ordinary construction 15.81 18.94 83.47% OUT OF RANGE 251,754.14 
First Officer in Metal 15.25 16.41 92.93% IN RANGE 38,244.83 
Expert in Metal 14.77 15.9 92.89% IN RANGE 23,754.96 
First Officer in Plumbing 15.25 16.41 92.93% IN RANGE 23,924.83 
Second Officer in Metal 14.81 15.95 92.85% IN RANGE 26,167.60 
First Officer in Painting 15.96 19.82 80.52% OUT OF RANGE 30,714.54 
First Officer in Electricity 11.87 16.41 72.33% OUT OF RANGE 26,719.62 
Second Officer in Plumbing 14.81 15.95 92.85% IN RANGE 19,011.85 
Table 3.  Comparison of Machinery Basic Prices. Source: Prepared by authors 
Machinery Project Price (euros) 
Database  
Price (euros) 
Project Price / 
Database Price 
(%) 
Comparison 
Project Amount 
(Measurement x 
Project Price) 
(euros) 
Mobile crane without platform 
(50 T) 123.07 216.17 56.93% OUT OF RANGE 13,523.42 
Exec team. Concrete screens 52.69 --- --- --- 28,586.17 
Retro tires. 70 cv 0.34 m3 29.73 50.44 58.94% OUT OF RANGE 9,127.32 
Transport Truck 15 tons 27.65 49.05 56.37% OUT OF RANGE 26,061.73 
Mechanical trowel 14.37 4.12 348.79% OUT OF RANGE 23,541.93 
Proportion of transport-screen 
machine 5.25 9.22 56.94% OUT OF RANGE 8,138.03 
Use of Steel lattice girder reticular 
formwork  4.23 7.43 56.93% OUT OF RANGE 6,637.16 
Loader tires102 cv 1.7 m3 11.89 44.61 26.65% OUT OF RANGE 3,982.73 
Use of Black Pine Wood Basin 19.69 34.6 56.91% OUT OF RANGE 3,641.29 
Use of Plastic bucket 80x76x25 
enc. reticular 1.09 1.93 56.48% OUT OF RANGE 4,234.99 
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Table 4.  Summary Table of the comparison between Project Basic Prices and Basic Prices Database 
Group of Basic Prices Nº of Compared Basic Prices Out of Range In Range 
Labor 10 5 5 
Machinery 9 0 9 
Materials 2 1 1 
Prices in Range (%) 28.57  
Group of Basic 
Prices 
Compared Amount 
(euros) 
Amount in range 
(euros) 
Amount out of 
range (euros) 
Amount in range 
(%) 
Amount out of 
Range (%) 
Labor 783,582.72 131,104.07 652,478.65 16.73 83.27 
Machinery 98,888.60 0.00 98,888.60 0.00 100.00 
Materials 88,559.17 52,571.67 35,987.50 59.36 40.64 
Total 971,030.49 183,675.74 787,354.75   
Total Amount in range (%) 18.92    
 
Finally, Table 4 summarizes the number of compared 
basic prices and the total economic value of each group 
studied. In this case the sample of basic prices is considered 
valid because it is possible to compare a total of 21 prices. 
However, the project is not considered valid from an 
economic point of view because only six prices have been 
considered within the range (28.57 % of price) and the 
amount of these six basic prices represents only 18.92% of 
the amount compared. This work should be re-examined by 
the editorial team or by the administration. 
4. Results 
The study sample consists of thirty-nine projects, twenty 
for the Civil Works subsector and nineteen for the Building 
subsector. These projects were tendered between 2008 and 
2011, 11% in 2008 and 2009, 37% in 2010 and 52% in 2011. 
The geographical scope of the contracting authorities is 
divided into Local, Provincial, Regional and National (42%, 
5%, 37% and 16% respectively). Depending on the number 
of criteria, thirty-six of the projects are tendering by the 
EMAT and three by the best economic offer (auction). 
The first phase includes an analysis of the available 
information. Only twenty of the thirty-nine projects from the 
initial sample could be compared due to important factors. 
First of all, there is not enough information in the project 
(budget and annex of prices). Secondly, the economic 
documentation is not accessible in electronic format 
(FIEDBC3 format 1). Of the nineteen projects which we 
cannot work with, fourteen belong to the Civil Works 
subsector and five of them to the Building subsector. In the 
structure of civil works projects, basic prices are included in 
the Annex of Prices, but only the unit prices, not the total 
amount of each basic price that exists in the project. 
The sample that starts working in phase 2 is composed of 
twenty projects, twelve from the Civil Works subsector and 
eight from the Building subsector. Regarding the 
geographical scope of the contracting authority: three are 
1 Standard exchange format of construction database 
National, nine are Regional and eight Local. Depending on 
the type of award procedure, eighteen are awarded by the 
EMAT and two by auction. 
The ten highest basic prices of each group (Labor, 
Equipment and Materials) are selected and compared (phase 
3) to the basic prices from the reference databases. As a 
result of phase 4, fifteen of the twenty projects of the sample 
are considered valid. 
If the projects considered valid are analyzed in more detail, 
an average of 23.47 compared basic prices is obtained, with 
an average distribution of 9.47 prices for labor, 8.80 basic 
prices for machinery and 5.20 basic prices for materials. In 
economic terms, this means an average compared amount of 
887,584.48 euros (47.20% corresponding to labor, 20.54% to 
machinery and 32.25% to materials). At a global level, the 
compared basic prices represent an average of 42.60% of the 
MEB of the different projects. 
Of the fifteen projects with a validated sample, eight 
belong to the Civil Works subsector and seven to the 
Building subsector. If the results are analyzed in terms of 
subsectors, the average number of compared prices in both 
subsectors is similar, 23.38 in Civil Works and 23.57 in 
Building, and their distribution is similar too (9.25 and 9.71 
respectively in Labor, 8.88 and 8.71 in Machinery, 5.25 and 
5.14 in Materials). However, there is a significant difference 
in the budget’s average amount in relation to the MEB,  
50.19% in Building and only 33.92% in Civil Works. If the 
compared amount is analyzed by groups, (Labor, Machinery 
and Materials), the results are 30.90%, 31.39% and 37.70% 
correspondingly for Civil Works, and 67.32%, 7.14% and 
25.53% respectively for Building. 
These data allow us to conclude that by comparing the 
same number of prices in Building and Civil Works, a bigger 
amount of the budget is validated in Civil Work projects, 
primarily because there are fewer units of work and the 
influence on the overall project is greater. The low 
percentage of basic prices of Machinery compared to basic 
prices of Labor in the Building Projects is a faithful 
reflection of the characteristics of this type of project, where 
the influence of labor in the whole process is crucial. 
If the analysis is performed by geographical scope, it is                                                              
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determined that six of the projects from the validated sample 
are local, seven regional and two national. At local scope, 
22.67 prices are compared versus 23.86 prices at regional 
level, but the amount of budget represents 47.39% regarding 
the MEB at local scope versus 37.1% at regional level. This 
difference is mainly due to the fact that the sample of 
projects at regional scope is primarily composed by works of 
the Building subsector.  
Once the samples are validated the next step is phase 5 
(validation of the project budget), considering it validated if 
at least fourteen of the selected basic prices are within the 
range of ± 15% from the basic prices of the reference 
database. Of the fifteen projects available, only two projects 
have been validated. One belongs to the Civil Works 
subsector and was tendered by the Traffic Division 
Headquarters, consisting in the "Construction of a driving 
track for 4-wheel vehicles in the Traffic School of the 
Spanish Civil Guard in Mérida (Badajoz)" with 20 basic 
prices validated and 38.50% of MEB validated (65.45% on 
the amount compared).  
The other project belongs to the Building subsector and 
was tendered by an entity of the government of the 
Community of Valencia called "Construcciones e 
Infraestructuras Educativas de la Generalitat Valenciana 
(CIEGSA)". The project consisted on the "Educational 
Center José Pedrós in the town of Piles (Valencia, Spain)" 
with 16 basic prices validated and 9.43% of the MEB 
validated (25.17 % from the amount compared). 
The remaining Projects should be returned to the project 
team, or if appropriate, to the offices of Project Supervision 
of the contracting authority, for an analysis of the proposed 
solution and a re-study (including materials used and 
construction processes) in order to make the project 
economically viable in accordance with market prices. 
Even though only two works have been validated from an 
economic point of view, if the sample is analyzed globally, 
the average amount of budget validated corresponds only to 
8.83% of MEB (25.84% of the amount compared). 
Analyzing the results by type of prices, one finds that the 
greatest validation of basic prices, both in number and 
amount, occurs in the prices of Labor, followed by Materials 
and finally by Machinery. 
This analysis is similarly performed with respect to the 
Civil Works and Building subsectors, and it may be 
concluded that the average amount of budget validated 
regarding the MEB is 10.71% in Civil Work projects and 
6.69% in Building projects. In Civil Works, the most 
validated basic prices correspond to the Materials (46.64% in 
relation to the MEB and 34.75% in relation to the amount 
compared) whereas in Building, the most validated basic 
prices are Labor (50.06% with respect to the MEB) and 
Machinery (32.36%  with respect to the amount compared). 
If this analysis is based on the geographical scope, the 
average amount of the budget validated only reaches a value 
of 7.40% for local projects and 6.46% for projects of regional 
scope. At local scope the group with the most validated 
prices is Labor, with 62.05% of the MEB and at regional 
scope, Materials with 33.45% of the MEB. 
5. Conclusions 
The methodology developed allows a simple and fast 
comparison of a considerable amount of the Project Budget. 
In the study sample, an average budget of 42.60% of the 
MEB is compared with an average of 23.47 compared basic 
prices.  
The application of the methodology endorses inherent 
characteristics of the projects for each of the subsectors, such 
as the large amount of Labor used in projects of Building 
subsector or the importance of Machinery in Civil Work 
projects. The characteristics of these projects allow us to 
conclude that by comparing the same number of prices in 
Building and Civil Works, a bigger amount of the budget is 
validated in Civil Work projects, primarily because there are 
fewer units of work and the influence on the overall project is 
greater. 
There is no influence of the geographical scope in the 
characteristics of the budget; it is marked by the type of 
subsector in which it is framed. 
The pricing of the works remains one of the most 
conflicting issues. The administration wants to carry out 
more actions or more complete actions than what the funding 
permits and it tends to perform more complex projects or 
projects with insufficient budgets, causing problems during 
the execution of the works. 
This fact is reflected in the application of the methodology 
where only two of the thirty-nine projects analyzed have 
similar basic prices (± 15%) to basic prices of the reference 
database. This means that only two of the projects in the 
sample have a budget in line with market prices, a necessary 
condition according to the European directives. 
The number of projects that are tendered economically 
poor along with the reduction in the number of investments 
in public procurement have lead bidders to create business 
policies that could be summarized as "get the contract and 
run” or "sign the contract and claim".  
These policies are based on getting the contract at all costs 
(with abnormally low bids or very significant improvements 
for the administration) and transferring the economic 
problems to the execution of the work with substantial 
claims on erroneous measurements, inconsistent prices, 
modified projects, etc. These actions involve a delay in the 
execution of the projects and at times threaten the viability of 
the project, so the government policies must not permit the 
tendering of projects without a budget according to the 
market prices.
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